Dr. Hajer Kratou is an economist. She got her Ph.D. in 2015 from the university of Auvergne, Clermont 1 (France). Her research interests are not only focused on external flows such as migrants’ remittances, but also on FDI and Official development assistance (ODA). She holds scopus-index publications related to different macroeconomic topics such as income inequality, globalization, remittances economic growth. Also she is involved in a research projects in political sciences with the Nordic Africa institute(Sweden). She worked as a lecturer in ESSECT (university of Tunis) for five semesters and as a secondary school teacher in rectorat of Clermont (France). Dr. Hajer worked for 2 years as a researcher in one of the pioneer micro finance institution in Tunis and as a consultant with the African Union. From the Fall 2017-Summer 2019, Dr. Hajer had worked in Prince Mohammed Bin Fahd University (KSA) for 2 years as assistant professor in economics and recently (fall 2019) she joined Ajman University in UAE, teaching in the department of finance. In September 2024, she has been promoted to the rank of Associate professor.
The relationship between academic freedom and democratic competence remains a critical research question in political science. Not only do the current studies not conclusively give us a clear clue about the nature of this relationship, but there is also an apparent ignorance of this critical question in Africa. In this chapter, we move a step closer to a more precise answer by analysing the trends of academic freedom and democratic consolidation in Africa with insights from three countries representing different experiences: Burundi, Ghana and Tunisia. Ghana is an example of stable democratic development with good academic freedom. However, threats to academic freedom still prevail. In Burundi, intimidation and discrimination among scholars and students are common, and the possibility of opposition to challenge the ruling party is also very restricted. In Tunisia, after 2011, the constitution guaranteed freedom of opinion, thought, expression, information and publication, but political developments in 2022 made it an example of democratic backsliding.
Current studies do not conclusively tell us whether there is a causal relationship between remittances and terrorism. Yet, this question is important because the answer has clear implications for the way remittances are monitored and handled. Hence, with this paper, we move a step closer to a definitive answer by studying the impact of remittances on specific terrorist events in 180 countries over the period 1970–2020. We also look in reverse at whether acts of terrorism attract remittances. From event-study analysis and a panel vector autoregression model, Granger causality tests, and a Cholesky decomposition to isolate shocks, we find that we can neither reject the hypothesis that remittances do not Granger-cause terrorism nor reject that terrorism does not Granger-cause remittances. We also find that terrorism response to remittances shock is negative. These findings do not support previous studies that show remittances could be used to fund terrorist attacks. Further, the response of remittance to terrorism shock is null, excepting for Latin America which shows a statistical negative effect. Remittances in Latin America do not appear to respond to conflict. Some of our findings are new, others contradict a large stream of literature (i.e. remittances as a potential source of financing). The insights should be useful to policymakers to facilitate the flow of remittances that result in more disposable income of recipient families
Part C of the United Nation’s (UN) 10th Sustainable Development Goal to reduce inequality addresses the high transaction costs faced by migrants when sending money home. The target is to reduce transaction fees to a maximum of 3%. To test the strength of these targets in reducing income inequality, we conducted instrumental variable (IV) estimations on 32 lowincome countries for the period 2008–2021. The results show that remittances – typically made by low-paid workers–help reduce income inequality in the home country and that high transaction fees probably reduce the average remitted amount, rather than discouraging migrants from sending money home. Both remitting behaviors contribute to widening the income gap. Based on our estimations, the ‘affordable level’ is up to 1.93%. Fees greater than this would result in fewer remittances given the budget constraints faced the remitters – often employed in unskilled jobs in high-income countries. Hence, our results do not support the SDG 10.c target of 3%, and suggest that the UN should thus revise the target and set fees to be no higher than 2%.
The growth/income inequality nexus is surrounded by theoretical as well as empirical ambiguities. These ambiguities can be lifted by focusing on the nature of inequalities and not their level. Inequalities may be the result of productive profit-seeking activities or unproductive rent-seeking activities. To re-assess empirically the growth/income inequality nexus, we first propose a strategy to approximate the nature of inequalities by an indicator of institutional quality. We propose an indicator of institutions’ productivity which describes the prevalence of institutions favourable to the search for profit and institutions fostering the search for rents, and conversely. It is an indirect measure of the predominance of rent-seeking activities over profit-seeking ones, and conversely. Then, using a panel data covering the period 1990–2020 for 114 countries (88 developing countries and 26 developed countries) and relying on the two-way fixed effects technique to test our estimator, we show that countries where institutions’ productivity is high, growth is positively related to income inequality. Conversely, growth is negatively related to income inequality in countries where institutions’ productivity is low. There is thus a positive relationship between productive inequalities and growth in countries where profit-seeking institutions dominate the institutional setting. By analogy, in countries where rent-seeking institutions are dominant there is a negative relationship between unproductive inequalities and growth. Contrary to previous public policy recommendations, inequalities should not be tackled since they are pro-growth in countries with high levels of institutions’ productivity.
The paper seeks to examine the association that exists among a number of energy-related variables such as energy use, renewable energy use, carbon pollutants and the economic growth of European Union countries. The examination of variables focus on twenty-one years of data from 2000 to 2020 using a multidimensional data framework. The findings come from empirical analysis carried out using panel VECM model and associated tests such as, panel unit root test, cointegration and the causality one. The different variables indicated above have positive effects on the growth of economies in various EU member states. Results obtained from the use of the heterogeneous causality test indicated that there is an indirect causality between energy use and the rate at which economies develop. Based on the findings obtained from the study, there is a need for EU member states to establish policies that should help to enhance efficiency in energy use to promote economic development.
In this paper we explore the role migrant skill composition plays in remittances and income inequality’ relationships, using a panel study of 53 African countries over the period 1990–2020 and referring to two strands of literature that demonstrate that (1) highly skilled migrants widen the income gap in the home country; and (2) they have fewer incentives to remit compared to their less-skilled compatriots. The instrumental variable technique was employed to estimate a dynamic panel data model whilst rectifying endogeneity issues. The findings reveal that a policy that shifts the migrant skill composition toward the less-skilled workers could channel more remittance funds to poor households, resulting in diminishing the income disparity in the home country. Migration policies attempting to mitigate the brain drain and facilitate the migration of lowskilled workers would enable the attenuation of the income inequality gap.